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Abstract: A question is proposed whether or not set theory is consistent.
We consider a formal set theory S, where we can develop a number theory.
As no generality is lost, in the following we consider a number theory that
can be regarded as a subsystem of S, and will call it S(0).
Definition 1. 1) We assume that a Go¨del numbering of the system S(0) is
given, and denote a formula with the Go¨del number n by An.
2) A(0)(a, b) is a predicate meaning that “a is the Go¨del number of a
formula A with just one free variable (which we denote by A(a)), and b is
the Go¨del number of a proof of the formula A(a) in S(0),” and B(0)(a, c) is
a predicate meaning that “a is the Go¨del number of a formula A(a), and
c is the Go¨del number of a proof of the formula ¬A(a) in S(0).” Here a
denotes the formal natural number corresponding to an intuitive natural
number a of the meta level.
Definition 2. Let P(x1, · · · .xn) be an intuitive-theoretic predicate. We say
that P(x1, · · · , xn) is numeralwise expressible in the formal system S
(0),
if there is a formula P (x1, · · · , xn) with no free variables other than the
distinct variables x1, · · · , xn such that, for each particular n-tuple of natural
numbers x1, · · · , xn, the following holds:
i) if P(x1, · · · , xn) is true, then ⊢ P (x1, · · · ,xn).
and
ii) if P(x1, · · · , xn) is false, then ⊢ ¬P (x1, · · · ,xn).
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Here “true” means “provable on the meta level.”
Lemma 1. There is a Go¨del numbering of the formal objects of the sys-
tem S(0) such that the predicates A(0)(a, b) and B(0)(a, c) defined above
are primitive recursive and hence numeralwise expressible in S(0) with the
associated formulas A(0)(a, b) and B(0)(a, c). (See [4].)
Definition 3. Let q(0) be the Go¨del number of a formula:
∀b[¬A(0)(a, b) ∨ ∃c(c ≤ b&B(0)(a, c))].
Namely
Aq(0)(a) = ∀b[¬A
(0)(a, b) ∨ ∃c(c ≤ b&B(0)(a, c))]
In particular
Aq(0)(q
(0)) = ∀b[¬A(0)(q(0), b) ∨ ∃c(c ≤ b&B(0)(q(0), c))]
Assume that S(0) is consistent.
Suppose that
⊢ Aq(0)(q
(0)) in S(0),
and let k(0) be the Go¨del number of the proof of Aq(0)(q
(0)). Then by the
numeralwise expressibility of A(0)(a, b)
⊢ A(0)(q(0),k(0)). (1)
Under our hypothesis of consistency,
⊢ Aq(0)(q
(0)) in S(0)
implies
not ⊢ ¬Aq(0)(q
(0)) in S(0).
Hence, for any integer ℓ, B(0)(q(0), ℓ) is false. In particular, B(0)(q(0), 0),
· · · , B(0)(q(0), k(0)) are false. By virtue of the numeralwise expressibility of
B(0)(a, c), from these follows that
⊢ ¬B(0)(q(0), 0),⊢ ¬B(0)(q(0), 1), · · · ,⊢ ¬B(0)(q(0),k(0)).
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Hence
⊢ ∀c(c ≤ k(0) ⊃ ¬B(0)(q(0), c)).
This together with ⊢ A(0)(q(0),k(0)) in (1) gives
⊢ ∃b[A(0)(q(0), b) &∀c(c ≤ b ⊃ ¬B(0)(q(0), c))].
This is equivalent to
⊢ ¬Aq(0)(q
(0)) in S(0).
A contradiction with our consistency hypothesis of S(0). Thus
not ⊢ Aq(0)(q
(0)) in S(0).
Reversely, suppose that
⊢ ¬Aq(0)(q
(0)) in S(0).
Then there is a Go¨del number k(0) of the proof of ¬Aq(0)(q
(0)) in S(0), and
we have
B(0)(q(0), k(0)) is true.
Thus
⊢ B(0)(q(0),k(0)),
from which follows
⊢ ∀b[b ≥ k(0) ⊃ ∃c(c ≤ b&B(0)(q(0), c))]. (2)
As ¬Aq(0)(q
(0)) is provable in S(0), there is no proof of Aq(0)(q
(0)) in S(0) by
our consistency assumption of S(0). Therefore
⊢ ¬A(0)(q(0), 0),⊢ ¬A(1)(q(1), 1), · · · ,⊢ ¬A(0)(q(0),k(0) − 1)
hold. Thus
⊢ ∀b[b < k(0) ⊃ ¬A(0)(q(0), b)]. (3)
Combining (2) and (3), we obtain
⊢ ∀b[¬A(0)(q(0), b) ∨ ∃c(c ≤ b&B(0)(q(0), c))],
which is
⊢ Aq(0)(q
(0)).
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A contradiction with our consistency assumption of S(0). Thus we have
not ⊢ ¬Aq(0)(q
(0)) in S(0).
We have reproduced Rosser’s form of Go¨del incompleteness theorem.
Lemma 2. Assume S(0) is consistent. Then neitherAq(0)(q
(0)) nor ¬Aq(0)(q
(0))
is provable in S(0).
Thus, we can add either one of Aq(0)(q
(0)) or ¬Aq(0)(q
(0)), which we will
denote A(0) hereafter, as a new axiom of S
(0) without introducing any
contradiction. Namely, let S(1) be an extension of the formal system S(0)
with an additional axiom A(0). Then by Lemma 2
S(1) is consistent. (4)
We now extend definitions 1 and 3 to the extended system S(1) as follows
with noting that the numeralwise expressibility of the predicates A(1)(a, b)
and B(1)(a, c) defined below can be extended to the new system S(1) with
the same Go¨del numbering as the one given in Lemma 1 for S(0).
1) A(1)(a, b) is a predicate meaning that “a is the Go¨del number of a
formula A(a), and b is the Go¨del number of a proof of the formula A(a) in
S(1),” and B(1)(a, c) is a predicate meaning that “a is the Go¨del number of
a formula A(a), and c is the Go¨del number of a proof of the formula ¬A(a)
in S(1).”
2) Let q(1) be the Go¨del number of a formula:
∀b[¬A(1)(a, b) ∨ ∃c(c ≤ b&B(1)(a, c))].
By the extended numeralwise expressibility, we have in the way similar to
Lemma 2 by using the consistency (4) of S(1)
not ⊢ Aq(1)(q
(1)) and not ⊢ ¬Aq(1)(q
(1)) in S(1).
Continuing the similar procedure, we get for any natural number n(≥ 0)
that
S(n) is consistent, (5)
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not ⊢ Aq(n)(q
(n)) and not ⊢ ¬Aq(n)(q
(n)) in S(n). (6)
We now let S(ω) the extended system of S(0) that includes all of the
formulas A(n)(= Aq(n)(q
(n)) or ¬Aq(n)(q
(n))) as its axioms. By (5) S(ω) is
consistent. We note that the formula A(n) is recursively defined if we have
already constructed the system S(n). Moreover, if we let q˜(n) be the Go¨del
number of the formula A(n), we have q˜(i) 6= q˜(j) for all natural numbers
i < j as A(j) is not provable in S
(i+1) for i < j. Thus supi≤n q˜(i) goes
to infinity as n tends to infinity. Further we note that q˜(n) is a recursive
function of n. Then given a formula Ar with Go¨del number r, restricting
our attention to the formulas A(n) with q˜(n) ≤ r, we can determine in S
(ω)
recursively if that given formula Ar is an axiom of the form A(n) or not.
Thus the addition of all A(n) retains the recursive definition of the following
predicates A(ω)(a, b) and B(ω)(a, c) defined in the same way as above.
A(ω)(a, b) is a predicate meaning that “a is the Go¨del number of a formula
A(a), and b is the Go¨del number of a proof of the formula A(a) in S(ω),”
and B(ω)(a, c) is a predicate meaning that “a is the Go¨del number of a
formula A(a), and c is the Go¨del number of a proof of the formula ¬A(a)
in S(ω).”
Then we see that the predicates A(ω)(a, b) and B(ω)(a, c) are numeralwise
expressible in S(ω) and the Go¨del number q(ω) of the formula:
∀b[¬A(ω)(a, b) ∨ ∃c(c ≤ b&B(ω)(a, c))],
denoted by Aq(ω)(a), is well-defined.
As before, we continue the similar procedure, transfinite inductively.
In this process, from the nature of our extension procedure, at each step
α where we construct the α-th consistent system S(α) from the preceding
systems S(γ) with γ < α, the predicates A(α)(a, b) and B(α)(a, c) must be
recursively defined from the preceding predicates A(γ)(a, b) and B(γ)(a, c)
(γ < α) so as for S(α) to be further extended with retaining consistency. For
this to hold, it is necessary and sufficient that the ordinal α is a recursive
ordinal.
Is there any ordinal that is not recursive? A function F (x) is called
recursive if it has the form:
F (x) = G(x, F |x),
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where F |x is a restriction of F to a domain x, and G is a given function.
Consider the formula for an ordinal x:
x = {y|y ∈ x}.
This meets the above requirement of the recursive definition of the ordinal
x, although this is tautological and may not be considered a definition
usually. But if we see the structure that it contains the domain x and by
using that domain only it defines x itself, it is not so unreasonable to think
that there is no nonrecursive ordinal.
There is, however, a possibility ([3]) that the condition whether or not
a nonrecursive ordinal exists in ZFC is independent of the axioms of ZFC.
In that case we have two alternatives.
Case i) There is no nonrecursive ordinal, and hence all ordinals are recur-
sive.
In this case, the extension of the system S(α) above is always possible.
Thus we can extend S(α) indefinitely forever. However, in this process, we
cannot reach the step where the number of added axioms is the cardinality
ℵ1 of the first uncountable ordinal, as the number of added axioms is at
most countable by the nature of formal system. Thus there must be a least
countable ordinal β such that the already constructed consistent system
S(β) is not extendable with retaining consistency. This contradicts the
unlimited extendibility stated above, and we have a contradiction. Insofar
as we assume that every ordinal is recursive, the only possibility remaining
is to conclude that set theory is inconsistent.
Case ii) There is a nonrecursive ordinal, thus there is a least nonrecursive
ordinal ω1 usually called Church-Kleene ordinal ([1], [6]).
In this case the above extension of S(α) is possible if and only if α < ω1.
We note that ω1 is a limit ordinal. For if it is a successor of an ordinal δ,
then δ < ω1 is recursive, hence so is ω1 = δ + 1, a contradiction with the
nonrecursiveness of ω1. Therefore we can construct, in the same way as
that for S(ω), a consistent system S(ω1), which cannot be extended further
with retaining consistency by the nonrecursiveness of ω1.
On the other hand, as we have seen in the discussion of case i), there
must be a least countable ordinal β such that the already constructed
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consistent system S(β) is not extendable with retaining consistency. Since
β is the least ordinal such that S(β) is not extendable, for any α < β the
system S(α) is consistently extendable. Whence by the reasoning above
about the recursiveness of α with which S(α) is consistently extendable, α
is recursive and we have α < ω1 if α < β. Thus
β ≤ ω1. (7)
Reversely, when α < ω1, α is a recursive ordinal. Thus by the same reason-
ing as above about the recursiveness of α, S(α) is consistently extendable.
Therefore α < β if α < ω1. This and (7) give
β = ω1.
Summarizing, we have proved
Theorem. Assume that S(0) is consistent. Suppose that the condition
whether or not there is a nonrecursive ordinal is independent of the axioms
of ZFC. Then there are the following two alternatives:
i) There is no nonrecursive ordinal, and hence all ordinals are recursive.
In this case set theory is inconsistent.
ii) There is a nonrecursive ordinal, thus there is a least countable nonre-
cursive ordinal β.
In this case the corresponding system S(β) is consistent and can-
not be extended further with retaining consistency.
We remark that this is a metamathematical theorem.
Thus the inconsistency in i) of this theorem does not give any proof in
ZFC of the existence of nonrecursive ordinal. To know whether a nonre-
cursive ordinal exists or not, we need a proof in ZFC or if such a statement
is independent of the axioms of ZFC, we need to add an axiom that de-
termines which the case is. In the latter case, the above theorem shows a
direction in which the extended ZFC can be consistent if the original ZFC
is consistent.
Further, as the above theorem is a metamathematical theorem, even if
there is no nonrecursive ordinal, the case i) of the theorem does not yield
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that set theory is inconsistent in the sense that we can find a concrete
inconsistent proposition like Russell’s paradox inside the set theory. Rather
it would be said that we may not find such an inconsistent proposition
insofar as we work inside the set theory ZFC. Thus this theorem should
not be interpreted as stating any concrete inconsistency of set theory.
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